We analyse the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to e ciently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a di↵erent body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than interests. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyse the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules e ciently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of 'yes' votes exceeds a particular quota.
Introduction
In the by now well-established theory of judgment aggregation, a group needs to form a 'yes' or 'no' judgment on di↵erent issues, based on the judgments of the group members on these issues. For instance, the jury in a court trial might need to form a judgment on whether the defendant has broken the contract, and whether the contract is legally valid; the United Nations security council might need to form a judgment on whether country X is threatened by a military coup, and whether the economy of country X is collapsing; and so on. Group judgments matter in practice. They may determine group action: in the court trial example, they may determine whether the defendant is convicted, and in the United Nations example they may determine whether a large-scale international intervention in country X will happen.
So far, nearly the entire judgment aggregation theory follows the classical socialchoice theoretic approach of aiming to find out how -and whether -group judgments can reflect the individuals' judgments in a procedurally fair manner, where 'fair' is spelled out in terms of axiomatic conditions on the aggregation rule (such as the anonymity condition or the Pareto-type condition of respecting unanimous judgments). The recent Symposium on Judgment Aggregation in Journal of Economic Theory (C. List and B. Polak eds., 2010, vol. 145(2) ) illustrates well this social-choice theoretic approach, as well as the state of the art of the theory, which we review below. This approach is certainly important in many contexts. The judgment aggregation literature so far, however, has paid only little attention to a di↵erent 'epistemic' approach of aiming to track the truth, i.e., reach true group judgments. The theory does not model the private information underlying voters' judgments, thereby preventing itself from studying questions of e cient information aggregation. Yet such an epistemic perspective seems particularly natural in the context of aggregating judgments (rather than preferences 1 ). In our court trial example, the ultimate goal seems indeed to be to find out independent facts (of whether the defendant has broken the contract and whether the contract is legally valid). So, the jury's voting rule should be optimised with respect to the goal that the resulting group judgments are true, not that they are fair to the jurors.
This alters the problem of designing the voting rule. Properties of voting rules standardly assumed in judgment aggregation theory, such as respecting unanimous judgments or anonymity, cannot be taken for granted anymore. If they turn out to be justified, they derive their justification from the truth-tracking goal rather than fairness considerations. To illustrate the contrast, suppose each juror expresses the judgment (opinion) that the contract was broken. A collective 'broken' judgment would then of course count as good from the classical social-choice theoretic perspective of procedural fairness. However, from a truth-tracking perspective, much depends on questions such as whether the jurors' judgments are su cient evidence for breach of contract, and whether voters have expressed their judgments truthfully. This paper analyses judgment aggregation from the truth-tracking and strategicvoting perspective. We model voters' private information, which allows us to ask questions about e cient information aggregation and strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting. Though new within judgment aggregation theory, the modelling of private information is well-established in a di↵erent body of literature about voting between two alternatives, which started with seminal work by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and can be placed in the broader context of work on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (see the review below). In the baseline case, voters share a common interest of finding out the 'correct' alternative, but hold possibly conflicting private information about which of the alternatives might be 'correct'. The voting rule should be designed so as to help finding the 'correct' alternative by making optimal use of all the private information scattered across the voters. So, the goal is e cient information aggregation. Such an 'epistemic' binary collective choice problem can in fact be viewed as a special judgment aggregation problem, involving just one issue. Our court trial example involves two issues: firstly, whether the contract was broken, and secondly, whether it is legally valid. If instead only the first issue were on the jury's agenda, the jury would face a single-issue judgment aggregation problem, or equivalently, a binary collective choice problem. The entire machinery and results of the mentioned binary collective choice literature could then be applied in order to design the voting rule.
This paper therefore combines insights from two largely disconnected fields, namely judgment aggregation theory and binary collective choice with common interests. Independently, Ahn and Oliveros (2011) and de Clippel and Eliaz (2011) take a similar approach, but ask di↵erent questions, as reviewed below. The two bodies of literature can learn from each other. Indeed, judgment aggregation theory can benefit from methodologies developed in the theory of binary colective choice with common interests, while the latter theory can in turn benefit from an extension beyond singleissue agendas towards more complex agendas with multiple issues. Analysing this multi-issue case does not reduce to analysing each issue separately, since preferences establish links between di↵erent issues.
It is worth starting simple. This paper therefore assumes that the group faces an agenda with just two issues, the simplest kind of multi-issue agenda; but many of our results generalize easily, as discussed in the appendix. Though simple, agendas with just two issues are important in practice. Our court trial example and United Nations example each involve two issues. To mention further two-issue agendas, a medical commission might need to issue joint judgments on whether a therapy is e↵ective, and whether it is compatible with given ethical standards; members of a political party in charge of elaborating the party programme might seek joint judgments on whether a tax cut is a↵ordable, and whether it is popular; a university hiring committee might seek joint judgments on whether a given candidate is good at research, and whether he or she is good at teaching; and finally, economic advisors to a government during the banking crisis in 2008 might need to issue collective judgments on whether a given bank has short-term liquidity problems, and whether it has long-term liquidity problems.
The issues of an agenda could in principle be mutually interconnected, so that the judgments taken on the issues logically constrain each other; for instance, a 'no' judgment on all issues might be inconsistent. Indeed, interconnections are what render judgment aggregation non-trivial if the usual social-choice theoretic approach of procedural fairness is taken. 2 However, within our truth-tracking approach, designing the voting rule is non-trivial even if the issues are mutually independent. We therefore assume independence between issues (see Bozbay 2012 for follow-up work on the case of interconnected issues).
Structure of the paper. Section 2 introduces our model, in which voters vote on the basis of private information and are guided by 'truth-tracking preferences', i.e., aim for true collective judgments. Section 3 addresses the key question of how to design the voting rule such that it leads to e cient decisions as well as simple-minded, truthful voting behaviour in equilibrium. It will turn out that in certain, but not all cases one should use a 'quota rule', which decides on each issue according to whether the number of 'yes' judgments on the issue exceeds a particular quota. The details depend on the exact kind of truth-tracking preferences. For certain preferences, the only voting rule which induces an e cient and truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a quota rule with particular thresholds. For certain other preferences, there is an entire class of such voting rules, including non-monotonic ones. Section 4 analyses the notion of truthful behaviour, by determining the conditions under which a 'sincere' voter directly reveals his information in his vote. In Appendix A, we consider the generalization of our framework and part of results from two to an arbitrary number m 2 of issues. This links us to the traditional literature on jury theorems that emerges as the special case of m = 1 issue. Finally, Appendix B contains all proofs.
Literature review. We now selectively review the two bodies of literature to which this paper connects, beginning with judgment aggregation theory. As mentioned, this theory's primary objective has so far been to find out which voting rules can aggregate the judgments of group members over some issues in accordance with certain axiomatic requirements with a classic social-choice theoretic flavour, such as unanimity preservation (the counterpart of the Pareto principle) and independence (the counterpart of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives). A series of possibility and impossibility results address this query, by giving answers which depend, firstly, on the axiomatic requirements on the voting rule, and secondly, on the agenda of issues under consideration (e.g., List and Pettit 2002 , Dietrich 2006 , 2007 , 2010 , Nehring and Puppe 2008 , 2010 , Dietrich and List 2007a , 2008 , Dokow and Holzman 2010a , 2010b , Dietrich and Mongin 2010 ; see also precursor results by Guilbaud 1952 and Wilson 1975 ; for an introductory overview see List and Polak 2010) . By contrast, a small minority of papers about judgment aggregation take a truth-tracking perspective (e.g., Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006 , List 2005 and Pivato 2011 . Their innovation is to apply the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem to judgment aggregation. Despite taking a truth-tracking perspective, they have little in common with our work, since private information and strategic incentives are not being considered. 3 List and Pettit (2011) provide the most systematic philosophical analysis of the truth-tracking approach, already discussing strategic incentives and private information and drawing on the second body of literature to which we now turn.
As for this second body of literature, it is concerned with voting rules for binary choice problems in which disagreements are driven (partly or totally) by conflicting information rather than conflicting interests. Specifically, the utilities which voters derive from decisions are a↵ected by the same unknown 'state of the world', about which voters hold private information. 4 Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) show that it typically cannot be rational for all voters to vote sincerely, and that the choice of voting rule matters considerably for sincere voting and e cient information aggregation. While the former authors consider the 'purely epistemic' case without conflict of interest, the latter authors introduce some preference heterogeneity (and focus primarily on large electorates). AustenSmith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) add an extra dimension of pre-voting deliberation. Duggan and Martinelli (2001) extend the approach to continuous rather than binary private information. Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi (2000) examine the (in)e↵ectiveness of unanimity rule in 'protecting the innocent' in jury trials. Goertz and Maniquet (2011) analyse e cient information aggregation in large electorates, showing that approval voting outperforms other voting rules in their setting.
Like us (and independently from us), Ahn and Oliveros (2011) and de Clippel and Eliaz (2011) also combine these two aggregation problems by studying elections on multiple binary issues with common preferences and asymmetric information. Each of these papers compares two voting procedures. Ahn and Oliveros (2011) compare resolving each issue by a majority vote among all voters with resolving each issue by a majority vote among a subgroup assigned to this issue (where the subgroups for di↵erent issues are disjoint and equally large). They show that neither of these procedures is generally more e cient than the other one if the group is large enough. De Clippel and Eliaz (2011) consider a group choice between two possible actions (such as convicting or acquitting the defendant), where the 'optimal' action depends on two or more issues/criteria, where each voter holds private information on each issue (possibly with correlations across issue). They compare premise-based voting with conclusion-based voting. Under the former, a vote is taken on each issue, and the outcomes determine the group action (conclusion). Under the latter, the group votes directly on which action to take, without forming a group view on the issues. They show that premise-based voting is more e cient than conclusion-based voting, but that the di↵erence vanishes asymptotically as the group size increases. These two works are important advances, into directions di↵erent from our work which is not concerned with comparisons of fixed mechanisms but with the design of e cient mechanisms.
The Model

A simple judgment aggregation problem
We consider a group of voters, labelled i = 1, ..., n, where n 2. This group needs a collective judgment on whether some proposition p or its negationp is true, and whether some other proposition q or its negationq is true. In our court trial example, p states that the contract was broken, and q that it is legally valid; in our job candidate example, p states that the candidate is good at research, and q that he or she is good at teaching; and so on for our other examples. The four possible judgment sets are {p, q}, {p,q}, {p, q} and {p,q}; we abbreviate them by pq, pq,pq andpq, respectively. For instance, pq means accepting p but not q. Each voter votes for a judgment set in J = {pq, pq,pq,pq}. After all voters cast their votes, a collective decision in J is taken using a voting rule. Formally, a voting rule is a function f : J n ! J , mapping each voting profile v = (v 1 , ..., v n ) to a decision d ⌘ f (v). Among the various voting rules, quota rules stand out as particularly natural and common. A quota rule is given by two thresholds m p , m q 2 {0, 1, ..., n + 1}, and for each voting profile it accepts p [q] if and only if at least m p [m q ] voters accept it in the profile. Quota rules have three salient properties:
• Anonymity: For all voting profiles (v 1 , ..., v n ) 2 J n and all permutations (i 1 , ...,
Informally, the voters are treated equally.
• Monotonicity: For all voting profiles v, v 0 2 J n , if for each r in f (v) the voters who accept r in v also accept r in v 0 , then f (v 0 ) = f (v). Informally, additional support for the collectively accepted propositions never reverses the collective acceptance of these propositions.
• Independence: The decision on each proposition r 2 {p, q} only depends on the votes on r. 5 Informally, the group in e↵ect takes two separate votes, one between p andp and one between q andq.
Remark 1 A voting rule f : J n ! J is a quota rule if and only if it is anonymous, monotonic and independent.
We briefly sketch the proof of the non-trivial direction of implication. As can be shown, if a voting rule f : J n ! J is anonymous and independent, then it is given by two sets M p , M q ✓ {0, 1, ..., n}, in the sense that for each voting profile v 2 J n the decision f (v) contains r (2 {p, q}) if and only if the number of votes in v containing r belongs to M r . If f is moreover monotonic, each set M r can be shown to take the form {m r , m r + 1, ..., n} for some threshold m r 2 {0, 1, ..., n + 1}. Clearly, f is the quota rule with thresholds m p and m q .
A common preference for true collective judgments
Exactly one judgment set in J is 'correct', i.e., contains propositions which are factually true. It is called the state (of the world) and is generically denoted by s. For instance, the state might be pq, so that p andq are true (andp and q are false). Voters have identical preferences, captured by a common utility function u : J ⇥ J ! R 5 Given a voting profile v, the subprofile with respect to r is denoted vr (2 {r,r} n ), and the collective decision with respect to r is denoted fr(v) (2 {r,r}). Independence means that for all voting profiles v, v
which maps any decision-state pair (d, s) to its utility u(d, s). Given voters' truthtracking goal, one would expect u(d, s) to be high if d = s, i.e., if the decision is correct. But how exactly should u be specified? We focus on two natural kinds of preferences:
Simple preferences. Here, the utility function is given by
Such preferences are the simplest candidate for truth-tracking preferences. Correct decisions are preferred to incorrect ones, without further sophistication.
Consequentialist preferences. Here, we assume that the decision leads to one of two possible consequences, typically representing group actions. This is captured by a consequence function Co which maps the set of possible decisions J to a twoelement set of possible consequences. The consequence function might look as follows in examples given earlier. In our court trial example, the court decision pq leads to conviction, since both premises of guilt are found to be satisfied (Co(pq) = 'conviction'), while the other decisions all lead to acquittal (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = Co(pq) = 'acquittal'). In our job candidate example, the decision pq leads to a hire since the candidate is seen as meeting both criteria (Co(pq) = 'hire'), while the other decisions all lead to no hire (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = Co(pq) = 'no hire'). In our United Nations example, the decisions pq andpq each lead to a large-scale international intervention in country X (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = 'intervention'), whereas the decisions pq andpq both lead to no intervention since the United Nations then consider an intervention as being too risky or unnecessary, respectively (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = 'no intervention'). In our bank rescuing example, the decisions pq andpq each lead to a governmental rescue plan for the bank (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = 'rescue'), whereas the decisions pq and pq both lead to no rescue plan since a rescue is seen as infeasible or unnecessary, respectively (Co(pq) = Co(pq) = 'no rescue'). The consequentialist utility function is given by
Incorrect decisions (d 6 = s) can have correct consequences (Co(d) = Co(s)). The hiring committee might view the candidate as good at research and bad at teaching when in fact the opposite is true, so that the resulting consequence ('no hire') is correct for wrong reasons. This gives high utility under consequentialist preferences, but low utility under simple preferences. 6
In the context of consequentialist preferences, one might wonder whether, given that all that counts is the consequence, it would not su ce to aggregate the voters' judgments on the consequence, ignoring judgments on the underlying issues -leading to a simple group decision problem between two alternatives. This would amount to an informational loss: while a voter's judgment on the consequence (the 'conclusion') follows from his judgments on the two issues (the 'premises'), the latter cannot generally be retrieved from the former. The lost information is valuable information, since, as will turn out, the e cient group action (which is 'found' by an optimal aggregation rule) often makes full use of a voter's judgments on the issues, rather than using only the information of which action follows from these judgments. Put formally, given the votes on the two issues v 1 , ..., v n 2 J n , an optimal aggregation rule f leads to the collective action Co(f (v 1 , ..., v n )) which depends on the submitted judgments v 1 , ..., v n in such a way that not only the information of the resulting consequences Co(v 1 ), ..., Co(v n ) is used. This suggests that voting directly on the consequence may lead to ine cient group actions, and that it is thus worth voting on the underlying issues. 7 In real life, many groups vote only on the consequence/action: while the underlying issues/premises typically play a role in the process of group deliberation and discussion prior to voting, the voting itself often only involves a simple yes/no choice on the action. As mentioned, such a conclusion-based procedure can be criticized based on our analysis.
The empirical question of which real-life decision making bodies vote directly on the conclusion and which (as assumed in this paper) vote on underlying issues is beyond the scope of this theoretical paper. In support of the real-life importance of voting on underlying issues, let us merely mention that for some decision-making bodies -such as some criminal courts, constitutional courts, central banks, or political organisations -it is desirable or even legally required to come up with reasons or justifications for the actions which are implemented, for reasons of legitimacy and accountability of public actions. In our terminology, the group needs a collective decision on the issues, not just a collective action/consequence. For instance, many courts must publicly state not just whether they convict the defendant, but also on what grounds they do so, which involves taking positions on multiple issues. See Kornhauser and Sager (1986) for public accountability of courts, and Pettit (2001) and List and Pettit (2011) for accountability and legitimacy of political organisations.
Private information and strategies
If voters had not just common preferences, but also common information about what the state might be, then no disagreement could arise. We however allow for in-7 A complete argument to the e↵ect that conclusion-based voting is ine cient also requires investigating the strategic incentives under the (di↵erent) game form of the conclusion-based procedure. Such an argument is made by De Clippel and Eliaz (2011), albeit in a di↵erent framework. Rigorously speaking, our results imply the ine ciency of the conclusion-based procedure only under the hypothesis that, under this procedure, a voter i votes for the consequence Co(vi) which follows from his vote vi under the issue-based procedure. (A violation of this hypothesis would constitute a form of untruthful voting, which could itself be viewed as a shortcoming of the conclusion-based procedure.) formational asymmetry. Each voter has a type, representing private information or evidence. 8 A voter's type takes the form of an element of J , generically denoted by t. For instance, a voter of type t = pq has evidence for p and forq. We write t = (t 1 , ..., t n ) 2 J n for a profile of voters' types. Nature draws a state-types combination (s, t) 2 J n+1 according to a probability measure denoted Pr. When a proposition r 2 {p,p, q,q} is meant to represent part of voter i's type rather than part of the true state, we often write r i for r. For instance, Pr(p i |p) is the probability that voter i has evidence for p given that p is true. By assumption, the prior probability that r (2 {p,p, q,q}) is true is denoted ⇡ r = Pr(r) and belongs to (0, 1), and the probability of getting evidence for r given that r is true is denoted a r = Pr(r i |r), belongs to (1/2, 1), and does not depend on the voter i. The parameters a p , ap, a q , aq measure the reliability of private information, as they represent probabilities of receiving 'truth-telling' information. The lower bound of 1/2 reflects the (standard) idea that information is more reliable than a fair coin. By assumption, voters' types are independent conditional on the state, and in addition the state and the types w.r.t. p are independent of the state and the types w.r.t. q. 9 These independence assumptions allow one to express the joint distribution of the state and the types by just a few parameters, namely ⇡ p , ⇡ q , a p , ap, a q , aq. For instance, the probability that the state is pq and all voters receive the truth-telling evidence pq is Pr(pq, p 1 q 1 , p 2 q 2 , ..., p n q n ) = Pr(pq) Pr(p 1 q 1 , p 2 q 2 , ..., p n q n |pq) = ⇡ p ⇡ q a n p a n q .
Each voter submits a vote in J based on his type. A (voting) strategy is a function : J ! J , mapping each type t 2 J to the type's vote v = (t). We write = ( 1 , ...., n ) for a profile of voters' strategies. Together with a voting rule f and a common utility function u, we now have a well-defined Bayesian game.
For a given type profile t 2 J n , we call a decision d e cient if it has maximal expected utility conditional on the full information t. 10 Some common notions of voting behaviour can now be adapted to our framework:
• A strategy of a voter is informative if (t) = t for all types t. An informative voter directly reveals his information in his vote.
8 The type could represent information that is not shared with other voters because of a lack of deliberation or limits of deliberation. More generally, a voter i's type could represent uncertainty of other voters about i's beliefs.
9 Recall that the state consists of a proposition in {p,p} and another in {q,q}. • A strategy of a voter is sincere if for every type t, the vote (t) maximises the expected utility conditional on the information t. A sincere voter votes for the decision which maximises the expected utility conditional on his type; so, he acts as if his vote alone determined the decision, neglecting the other voters and their strategies. (Technically, this amounts to optimal behaviour in a hypothetical single-player decision problem.)
• A strategy profile = ( 1 , ..., n ) is e cient if for every type profile t = (t 1 , ..., t n ) the resulting decision d = f ( 1 (t 1 ) , ..., n (t n )) is e cient (i.e., has maximal expected utility conditional on full information t). Hence, all the information spread across the group is used e ciently: the collective decision is no worse than a decision of a (virtual) social planner who has full information.
• A strategy profile = ( 1 , ..., n ) is an equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding Bayesian game, i.e., if each strategy is a best response to the other strategies. In such a profile, each voter maximises the expected utility of the collective decision given the strategies of the other voters. (In this maximisation exercise, it turns out that a voter must only consider cases in which his vote is pivotal. Under a quota rule with majority thresholds, a voter is for instance pivotal if half of the other voters votes pq and the other half votespq.)
While informativeness and sincerity are properties of a single strategy (or voter), e ciency refers to an entire profile.
Finally, to avoid distraction by special cases, we make two assumptions. First, we exclude the degenerate case in which some decision in J is not e cient for any type profile whatsoever. Second, we exclude e ciency ties, i.e., we exclude those special parameter combinations such that some type profile t leads to di↵erent e cient decisions (with di↵erent consequences when we assume consequentialist preferences).
constitute an equilibrium. If additionally informative voting is e cient, both goals are reached. So, the double goal is that informative voting should be e cient and form an equilibrium. By part (a) of the following theorem, whenever informative voting is e cient, it a fortiori defines an equilibrium -which explains our primary objective that informative voting be e cient.
Theorem 1 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J 2 ! R.
(a) For any voting rule, if a strategy profile is e cient, then it is an equilibrium.
(b) There is an anonymous voting rule for which informative voting is e cient (hence, an equilibrium).
This theorem, whose part (a) follows from a well-known result by McLennan (1998) , is general in that it applies to any kind of (common) preferences. The converse of part (a) does not hold: for instance, under a constant voting rule all strategy profiles are equilibria, typically without being e cient. The message of part (b) is positive but so far vague: it is always possible to make informative voting e cient, but apart from anonymity we do not know anything about the kind of voting rule we can use. And indeed, for some kinds of common preferences, it may not be possible to aggregate in an independent or monotonic way (as counterexamples show). But, once we narrow down to simple or consequentialist preferences, can -or even mustwe aggregate in a monotonic resp. independent way? When can -or even must -we use a quota rule? Such questions are answered below.
Simple preferences
This section addresses the case of simple preferences, given by the common utility function (1). Which rules render informative voting e cient? The answer is 'simple', as we will see. To state our result, we first define two coe cients: 13 ever finds himself in an informational position to consider d as best -a rather uninteresting, if not unnatural scenario.
13 The minimum defining kp or kq should be interpreted as n + 1 if the set whose minimum is being taken is empty. In fact, emptiness is impossible under simple preferences. This follows from our non-degeneracy assumption on the model parameters (which also implies that kp, kq 2 {1, ..., n}). Note that in (3) and (4) the right hand side of the inequality is strictly decreasing in k.
Theorem 2 Assume simple preferences. Informative voting is e cient if and only if the voting rule is the quota rule with thresholds k p and k q .
This result shows that the quota rule with thresholds k p and k q is the only rule we may use in view of making informative voting e cient. This result is much more specific than the purely existential claim in part (b) of Theorem 1. This progress was possible by focusing on simple preferences.
Consequentialist preferences: first type
We now turn to consequentialist preferences. Much depends on the nature of the consequence function. In principle, there exist 2 4 = 16 potential consequence functions from J to a binary set of consequences. But, as we shall see shortly, there are only two non-degenerate consequence functions up to isomorphism. We therefore define two types of consequentialist functions. Consequentialist preferences (or the consequence function) are said to be:
• of type 1 if Co(pq) = Co(pq) 6 = Co(pq) = Co(pq);
• of type 2 if Co(pq) 6 = Co(pq) = Co(pq) = Co(pq).
Our first two examples of consequentialist preferences in Section 2.2 are of type 1, while our last two examples are of type 2. But why are all non-degenerate consequences of one of these two types? Firstly, consequence functions for which each decision in J has the same consequence are of course degenerate and therefore uninteresting. Also consequence functions which depend only on the decision between p andp, or only on the decision between q andq, are degenerate, since in this case we are essentially back to a decision problem with a single proposition-negation pair, which has already been studied in the literature. 14 The non-degenerate consequence functions are those which genuinely depend on both propositions. Among all of them, some assign each consequence to exactly two decisions in J , while the others assign one consequence to three decisions and the other consequence to just one decision. As one can show, the former consequence functions are of type 1, while the latter are of type 2 up to isomorphism (i.e., up to exchanging p andp and/or exchanging q and q). Thus, by studying our two types of consequence functions, we will have covered non-degenerate consequentialist preferences exhaustively.
We now address the first type, while the next subsection turns to the second type. One might at first expect there to be little resemblance between the current preferences and simple preferences in terms of the appropriate voting rule. For instance, even when all individuals have type pq, so that there is overwhelming evidence for state pq, the current preferences allow us to e ciently decide forpq, since this decision has the same consequence as pq. Surprisingly, despite the di↵erences, consequentialist preferences of type 1 come much closer to simple preferences than to consequentialist preferences of type 2 in terms of the design of the voting rule. The coe cients k p and k q , defined earlier for simple preferences, again play a key role.
Theorem 3 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 1. A voting rule makes informative voting e cient and is monotonic if and only if it is the quota rule with thresholds k p and k q .
So, as for simple preferences, the social planner is led to impose a quota rule with the particular thresholds k p and k q . What distinguishes Theorem 3 from Theorem 2 is, for one, its somewhat di↵erent (and longer) proof, and secondly, the additional monotonicity requirement. Without this extra condition, a number of other voting rules become possible. 15
Consequentialist preferences: second type
We now turn to consequentialist preferences of type 2. The space of aggregation possibilities is somewhat di↵erent here. As we shall show, quota rules are not always possible, and when they are, the two thresholds must be calculated di↵erently.
For all k, l 2 R, we define the coe cient
(5) One can show that (k, l) has a natural interpretation if k, l 2 {0, 1, ..., n}: it is the probability that the state is pq conditional on having k times evidence for (and n k times evidence against) p and l times evidence for (and n l times evidence against) q. So, (k, l) = Pr(pq|t) for some (hence, any) type profile t 2 J n containing p exactly k times and q exactly l times; or equivalently, (k, l) = Pr(p|p 1 , ...p k ,p k+1 , ...,p n ) ⇥ Pr(q|q 1 , ..., q l ,q l+1 , ...,q n ).
As one can prove by drawing on the definition of the consequence function, given a type profile t containing p exactly k times and q exactly l times, if (k, l) > 1/2 then only the decision pq is e cient, while otherwise the three other decisions are all e cient. This implies a first, simple characterization result. Henceforth, the number of votes for a proposition r in a voting profile v is written n v r .
Proposition 1 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. A voting rule f makes informative voting e cient if and only if for every voting profile v 2 J n the decision f (v) is pq if (n v p , n v q ) > 1/2 and in {pq,pq,pq} otherwise.
15 For consequentialist preferences of type 1, one may show that a (possibly non-monotonic) voting rule f makes informative voting e cient if and only if for every voting profile v 2 J n the decision f (v) has the same consequence as the decision under the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq (i.e., Co f = Co g, where g is this quota rule). So, once we drop the monotonicity requirement, there is not just one possible voting rule, as for simple preferences, but 2 4 n possible rules (since there are 2 allowed decisions for each of the 4 n profiles in J n ).
Which possibilities -if any -are left if we require the rule to be a quota rule? We begin by introducing two coe cients. Given that all voters hold evidence for q, how many voters with evidence for p does it minimally take for the decision pq to become e cient? Similarly, given that all voters hold evidence for p, how many voters with evidence for q does it take for the decision pq to become e cient? The answer to these questions is given by the following numbers, respectively: 16 l p := min{k 2 {0, ..., n} : (k, n) > 1/2} (6)
Theorem 4 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. There exists a quota rule making informative voting e cient if and only if (l p , l q ) > 1/2. In this case, that quota rule is unique and has the thresholds l p and l q .
Unlike when preferences are simple or consequentialist of type 1, and unlike in the classic literature for a single pair of propositions p,p, we have an impossibility:
Corollary 1 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. For some combinations of values of the model parameters (⇡ p , ⇡ q , a p , ap, a q , aq and n), no quota rule makes informative voting e cient.
For instance, if ⇡ p = ⇡ q = 0.5, a p = a q = ap = aq = 0.7 and n = 3, no quota rule makes informative voting e cient, whereas if instead ⇡ p = ⇡ q = 0.6, the quota rule with thresholds l p = l q = 2 makes informative voting e cient.
While by Corollary 1 it may be utopian to aim for a full-fledged quota rule, we now show that one can always achieve two characteristic properties of quota rules, namely anonymity and monotonicity, while often losing the third characteristic property, namely independence. Specifically, we characterize the class of all monotonic and anonymous (but not necessarily independent) aggregation possibilities. As we shall see, this class consists of so-called quota rules 'with exception'. Such rules behave like a quota rule as long as the profile does not fall into an 'exception domain', while generating the 'exception decision' pq on the exception domain. Formally, we define quota rules with exception as follows:
A quota rule with exception f : J n ! J is given by thresholds m p , m q 2 {0, ..., n+ 1} and an 'exception domain' E ✓ J n , and is defined as follows for all voting profiles v 2 J n :
• if v 6 2 E then f (v) contains any proposition r in {p, q} if and only if n v r m r (as for a regular quota rule),
16 These two minima are taken over non-empty sets of values of k (by the non-degeneracy assumption at the end of Section 2.3). Figure 1(a) shows the generic case. In Figure 1(b) , the thresholds are chosen in a maximal way, i.e., m p = m q = n + 1. As a result, the decisions pq andpq are never taken, and the voting rule takes a particularly simple form:
for all voting profiles v 2 J n . In Figure 1 (c), the thresholds are chosen in a minimal way. That is, m p is the minimal number for which (m p , l q ) > 1/2; in short, m p is chosen such that (m p , l q ) ⇡ 1/2, as illustrated by the figure. Similarly, m q is chosen such that (l p , m q ) ⇡ 1/2. As a result, the voting rule takes the following form, as the reader may check:
This rule is special in that it reduces to the quota rule making informative voting e cient (defined in Theorem 4) whenever such a quota rule exists.
When is informative voting sincere?
While the previous section focuses on designing a voting rule, the present section does not depend on the voting rule. We focus on a single voter and answer the question of when informative voting is sincere, that is, when the naive strategy of 'following the evidence' is worthwhile for a sincere voter. For each type of preference, we fully characterize the parameter combinations for which this is so. We begin with simple preferences.
Theorem 6 Under simple preferences, the informative voting strategy is sincere if and only if This result has an intuitive interpretation. We know that necessarily the upper bound ar 1 ar for ⇡r 1 ⇡r exceeds 1 and the lower bound 1 ar ar is below 1, since a r , ar > 1/2. For very high or very low values of the prior probabilities ⇡ r , the ratio ⇡r 1 ⇡r is far from 1, so that one of the bounds is violated and informative voting is not sincere. This makes sense since if voters have 'strong' prior beliefs, then the evidence collected cannot overrule the prior beliefs: sincere votes cease to be sensitive to evidence, i.e., depart from informative votes. By contrast, for less strong prior beliefs, the inequalities are satisfied, so that informative voting is sincere, i.e., it is worth following the evidence as a sincere voter.
Another useful perspective on the result is obtained by focusing not on the parameters ⇡ r representing prior beliefs, but on the parameters a r and ar representing 'strength of evidence'. The larger a r and ar are (i.e., the 'stronger' private evidence for r andr is), the greater the upper bound for ⇡r 1 ⇡r is and the smaller the lower bound is, which makes it easier to meet both inequalities. In summary, su ciently strong evidence and/or su ciently weak prior beliefs imply that it is worth voting informatively ('following the evidence') as a sincere voter. Surprisingly, the characterization remains the same as we move from simple preferences to consequentialist preferences of type 1 (though the proof is quite di↵erent):
Theorem 7 Under consequentialist preferences of type 1, the informative voting strategy is sincere if and only if One can interpret this result in a similar way as done for simple preferences. Finally, we turn to consequentialist preferences of type 2. Here, the characterization is based on the following three coe cients:
Theorem 8 Although the characterizing inequalities are more complicated than for the previous two kinds of preference, an interpretation in terms of strength of evidence is again possible. If the voter's evidence is su ciently strong (i.e., if a p , ap, a q , aq are su ciently close 1), then C is well below 1 and A and B are well above 1, so that the inequalities are likely to hold; as a result, informative voting is sincere, i.e., it is worth following the evidence as a sincere voter. 
A Generalization to an arbitrary number of issues
We have so far considered a two-issue agenda. But many of our results generalize to an arbitrary number m 2 {1, 2, 3, ...} of issues. Such a generalization is of obvious interest, firstly because it establishes the link with the traditional literature on jury theorems, which considers m = 1 issue, and secondly because judgment aggregation theory rarely limits the size of the agenda.
Let us be precise. Our results for simple preferences generalize smoothly to the missue case (where for m = 1 issue we recover a key result by Austen-Smith and Banks 1996). For consequentialist preferences, the picture becomes more complicated, since the number and structural complexity of possible consequence functions grows rapidly with m, so that it does not su ce to consider two types of consequentialist preferences. This is why, although our findings on consequentialist preferences do partly generalize to the m-issue case, these generalizations cover only a small portion of the large variety of possible consequentialist preferences for m > 2 issues. For only m = 1 issue, however, there essentially exists only one type of consequentialist preferences, which coincides with simple preferences. We therefore limit our present m-issue analysis to the case of simple preferences, while leaving consequentialist preferences to future research.
We begin by generalizing our model. We consider a fixed number m 2 {1, 2, 3, ...} of issues. For each issue j (2 {1, 2, ..., m}), the group needs to form a collective judgment on whether a proposition p j or its negationp j is true. Each set {p ⇤ 1 , ..., p ⇤ m }, which for any issue j contains a proposition p ⇤ j from {p j ,p j }, is a possible judgment set. Let J m be the set of possible judgment sets for our m-issue agenda. (Note that if m = 2 then J m is our earlier set J , with p 1 = p and p 2 = q.) A voting rule
A quota rule is a voting rule defined by m thresholds h p 1 , ..., h pm in {0, 1, ..., n}, where, under any given voting profile, a proposition p j is accepted if and only if at least h p j voters accept it.
There is an objective fact as to which propositions are true and which false: exactly one (unknown) judgment set in J m is 'correct'; it is referred to as the state and contains the 'true' propositions. Everyone aims for a correct collective decision. Specifically, each voter holds the same preferences over decision-state pairs (d, s) 2 J 2 m , given by a common utility function u : J 2 m ! R. We focus on simple preferences, defined by the utility function is given by
Each voter i receives a noisy private signal t i 2 J m , his type; intuitively, it contains the propositions for which the voter holds private evidence. A type profile is a vector t = (t 1 , ..., t n ) 2 J n m . Nature draws a state-types combination (s, t) 2 J m ⇥ J n m according to a probability measure denoted Pr. Just as in the two-issue case, one defines the notions of an e cient decision given a type profile, a (voting) strategy, an informative strategy (or strategy profile), a sincere strategy (or strategy profile), an e cient strategy profile, and an equilibrium strategy profile.
When a proposition r 2 {p 1 ,p 1 , ..., p m ,p m } is meant to represent part of voter i's type rather than part of the true state, we often write r i for r. By assumption, the prior probability that r 2 {p 1 ,p 1 , ..., p m ,p m } is true is denoted ⇡ r = Pr(r) and belongs to (0, 1), and the probability of getting evidence for r 2 {p 1 ,p 1 , ..., p m ,p m } given that r is true is denoted a r = Pr(r i |r), belongs to (1/2, 1), and does not depend on the voter i. Further, voters' types are independent conditional on the state, and in addition the state and the types w.r.t.
any proposition are independent of the state and the types w.r.t. any other proposition. To avoid special cases, we exclude that some decision in J m is not e cient for any type profile, and that some type profile leads to multiple e cient decisions (i.e., an e ciency tie). The following two Theorems for simple preferences in the m-issue case generalize Theorems 2 and 6 for the two-issue case as well as classic results by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) for the one-issue case. We first generalize our earlier coe cients 'k p ' and 'k q '. For each proposition p j in {p 1 , ..., p m }, we define the coe cient 18
Interpretationally, for the proposition p j to be more probably true than false given a type profile, p j must occur at least k p j times in this type profile.
Theorem 9 Under simple preferences, informative voting is e cient if and only if the voting rule is the quota rule with thresholds k p 1 , ..., k pm .
Theorem 10 Under simple preferences, the informative voting strategy is sincere if and only if
Finally, Theorem 1 about an arbitrary kind of (common) preferences also generalizes to any number of issues. This theorem continues to hold as stated, simply replacing 'J ' by 'J m '.
B Proofs
We begin by some preliminary derivations (Section B.1). We then prove the results of the main in a new order obtained by clustering the results according to the kind of preferences (Sections B.2-5). We finally prove the results of Appendix A (Section B.6).
Conventions. Recall the notation 'f r ' introduced in fn. 5 and the notation 'S' for the random variable generating the state s in J introduced in fn. 10. Doublenegations cancel each other out, i.e., p stands for p, and q for q. We refer to the two technical assumptions made at the end of Section 2.3 as 'non-degeneracy' and 'no e ciency ties', respectively.
B.1 Preliminary derivations
The joint probability of a state-types vector (s, t) = (s p s q , t 1p t 1q , ..., t np t nq ) 2 J n+1 is Pr(s, t) = Pr(s) Pr(t|s) = Pr(s) Y 
The probability of the four states in J conditional on the full information t 2J n is given as follows, where k := n t p and l := n t q :
Pr(pq|t) = ⇡p(1 ap) k a n k p ⇡q(1 aq) l a n l q Pr(t) .
B.2 General preferences
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) As mentioned, this part follows from McLennan (1998), but for completeness we include a proof. We write T i (= T ip T iq ) for the random variable generating voter i's type in J , and T = (T 1 , ..., T n ) for the random type profile. Consider any voting rule f : J n ! J and any e cient strategy profile = ( 1 , ..., n ). To show that is an equilibrium, consider any voter i and type t i 2 J . We have to show that i's vote i (t i ) maximizes the expected utility conditional on i's type, i.e., that
where ( i (t i ), i (T i )) and (v i , i (T i )) of course denote the voting profiles in which i votes v i resp. i (t i ) and each j 6 = i votes j (T j ). To show this, note that for all v i 2 J ,
where the inequality holds because the strategy profile ( i , i ) = is e cient for the type profile (t i , t i ) = t.
(b) Since by (16)- (19) the conditional distribution of the state given full information t 2 J n depends on t only via the numbers n t p and n t q , so does the conditional expected utility of each decision, and hence, the set of e cient decisions. For each (k, l) 2 {0, 1, ..., n} 2 , let F (k, l) 2 J be a decision that is e cient for some (hence, every) t 2 J n for which n t p = k and n t q = l. The voting rule f defined by
is clearly anonymous and renders informative voting e cient. ⇤
B.3 Simple preferences
Although Theorems 2 and 6 about simple preferences are later generalized to the multi-issue case, we give direct proofs of these theorems; this is helpful since the two-issue case is more concrete and elementary than the general m-issue case.
We begin by two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Assume simple preferences. The expected utility of a decision d 2 J is
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type profile is given by the analogous expression with a conditional probability instead of an unconditional one.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the definition of the utility function. ⇤
The next lemma invokes the coe cients k p and k q defined in (3) and (4).
Lemma 2 Assume simple preferences. For all type profiles t 2 J n , all r 2 {p, q}, and all decisions d, d 0 2 J such that d but not d 0 contains r, and d and d 0 share the other proposition,
Proof. Let t 2 J n . We first prove the equivalence for r = p, d = pq and d 0 =pq. By the definition of k p , the inequality n t p k p is equivalent to
which by (16) and (18) is equivalent to Pr(pq|t) > Pr(pq|t), and hence by Lemma 1 to E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t). Next, suppose r = p, d = pq and d 0 =pq. Using (17) and (19), the inequality (20) is equivalent to Pr(pq|t) > Pr(pq|t), and hence, to E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t). The proof for the remaining cases is analogous. ⇤
We are now in a position to prove the two theorems about simple preferences.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a rule f : J n ! J .
A. First, assume f is the quota rule with thresholds k p and k q . Consider a given type profile t 2 J n . Supposing that voters vote informatively, the resulting voting profile is v = t. We have to show that the decision d := f (v) is e cient for t, i.e., that (*) E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d 0 , S)|t) for all d 0 2 J \{d}. (We use '>' rather than ' ' in (*) because of our 'no e ciency ties' assumption.) The property (*) follows from Lemma 2. For instance, if d = pq, then by definition of f we have n t p k p and n t q k q , so that Lemma 2 implies the inequality in (*) for d 0 =pq and d 0 = pq For instance, if d = pq, then by definition of f we have n t p k p and n t q k q , so that Lemma 2 implies that E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t), E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t), which in turn implies (*); and if d =pq, then n t p < k p and n t q < k q , so that Lemma 2 implies that E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t), E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t), which again implies (*).
B. Conversely, suppose informative voting is e cient under f . We consider any v 2 J n and r 2 {p, q}, and must show that (**) f r (v) = r , n v r k r . Consider the type profile t = v. Since informative voting is e cient, the decision d = f (v) is e cient for t (= v), i.e., satisfies condition (*) above. Lemma 2 and (*) together imply (**). For instance, if f (v) = pq, then (**) holds because, firstly, f r (v) = r, and secondly, n v r k r by (*) and Lemma 2. ⇤ Proof of Theorem 6. A. First, assume informative voting is sincere. Equivalently, for any given type t 2 J , E(u(d, S)|t) is maximal at d = t, i.e., by Lemma 1 (*) Pr(d|t) is maximal at d = t. Applying (*) to type t = pq, we have Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t), which implies ⇡p 1 ⇡p 1 ap ap by (12) and (14). Now applying (*) to type t =pq, we obtain Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t), which by (12) and (14) implies ap 1 ap ⇡p 1 ⇡p . We have shown both inequalities relating to p. The two inequalities relating to q can be proved analogously.
B. Now suppose ar 1 ar ⇡r 1 ⇡r 1 ar ar for each r 2 {p, q}. We consider any type t 2 J and have to show that the decision d = t has maximal expected utility given t, or equivalently, that (*) holds.
We show (*) first in the case t = pq. Here, the inequality ⇡p 1 ⇡p 1 ap ap implies Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t) by (12) and (14), and it implies Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t) by (13) 
k r for both or no r 2 {p, q}].
Proof. Consider any t 2 J n , d 2 {pq,pq} and d 0 2 {pq,pq}. Define g r (k) := ⇡ r a k r (1 a r ) n k and gr(k) := (1 ⇡ r )(1 ar) k a n k r for all r 2 {p, q} and k 2 R. For each r 2 {p, q}, the definition of k r can now be rewritten as k r = min{k 2 {0, 1, ..., n + 1} :
k r for both or no r 2 {p, q}] by (*). ⇤
We can now prove our two theorems about the present preferences.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a rule f : J n ! J . A. Assume f is the quota rule with thresholds k p and k q . Firstly, f is monotonic. Secondly, to show that informative voting is e cient, consider a given type profile t 2 J n . Supposing informative voting, the resulting voting profile is then v := t. We have to show that d := f (v) is e cient for t, i.e., that for each d 0 2 J with
k r for both r 2 {p, q}, implying (*) by Lemma 4. If d =pq, then n t r k r for no r 2 {p, q}, again implying (*) by Lemma 4. Finally, if d ispq or pq, then n t r k r for exactly one r 2 {p, q}, so that (*) holds once again by Lemma 4. B. Conversely, assume f is monotonic and makes informative voting e cient. We consider any v 2 J n and must show that (**) f r (v) = r , n v r k r for each r 2 {p, q}. As one can show using our non-degeneracy assumption, k r 6 2 {0, n + 1} for some r 2 {p, q};
for instance, if k r were zero for each r 2 {p, q}, then by Lemma 4 the decisionspq and pq would be ine cient for each type profile, violating non-degeneracy. We now prove (**) by distinguishing four cases. Case 1 : n v r k r for each r 2 {p, q}. We must show that f (v) = pq. Since the decision f (v) is e cient for the type profile t = v, by Lemma 4, f (v) 2 {pq,pq}. Suppose for a contradiction f (v) =pq. By (21), k r 1 for some r 2 {p, q}. Suppose k p > 0 (the case that k q > 0 being analogous). Let v 0 be the voting profile obtained from v by replacing each occurring p byp. By monotonicity, the decision is f (v 0 ) =pq. By Lemma 4, for the type profile t 0 = v 0 onlypq and pq are e cient since n t 0 p = 0 < k p and n t 0 q = n v q k q . So, the decision f (v 0 ) (=pq) is ine cient, a contradiction since f makes informative voting e cient.
Case 2 : n v p k p and n v q < k q . We must show that f (v) = pq. By Lemma 4, pq andpq are both e cient for the type profile t = v. So, as informative voting is e cient, f (v) 2 {pq,pq}. Suppose for a contradiction f (v) =pq. By (21), k p > 0 or k q  n. First, if k p > 0, define v 0 as in Case 1. By monotonicity, the decision is f (v 0 ) =pq, which is ine cient for the type profile t 0 = v 0 by Lemma 4 as n t 0 p = 0 < k p and n t 0 q = n v q < k q , a contradiction. Second, if k q  n, define v 0 as the voting profile obtained from v by replacing each occurringq by q. By monotonicity, the decision is f (v 0 ) =pq, which is again ine cient for the type profile t 0 = v 0 by Lemma 4 as n t 0 p = n v p k p and n t 0 q = n k q , a contradiction. Case 3 : n v p < k p and n v q k q . One can show that f (v) =pq like in Case 2. Case 4 : n v r < k r for each r 2 {p, q}. We must show that f (v) =pq. By informative voting being e cient and by Lemma 4 applied to t = v, f (v) 2 {pq,pq}. Suppose for a contradiction that f (v) = pq. By (21), k r  n for some r 2 {p, q}. We assume that k p  n (the proof being analogous if k q  n). Let the voting profile v 0 2 J n arise from v by replacing each occurringp by p. By monotonicity, f (v 0 ) = pq. This outcome is ine cient for the type profile t 0 = v 0 by Lemma 4 and n t 0 p = n k p and n t 0 q = n v q < k q . ⇤ Proof of Theorem 7. A. First, let informative voting be sincere. Equivalently, for any type t 2 J , (*) E(u(d, S)|t) is maximal at d = t. Using (*) with t = pq, we have E(u(pq, S)|t) E(u(pq, S)|t), which by Lemma 3 is equivalent to Pr(pq|t)+Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t) + Pr(pq|t). Using (12)-(15), the latter is equivalent to
which can be rearranged as
Analogously, using (*) three more times, with t = pq, then t =pq and finally t =pq, we obtain
Firstly, (i) for each r 2 {p, q}. We have to show that informative voting is sincere, i.e., that (*) holds for each type t 2 J . As one can check, the inequalities (22)- (25) all hold. These inequalities imply that (*) holds for each type t 2 J . For instance, as shown in part A, (22) reduces to E(u(pq, S)|t) E(u(pq, S)|t) for t = pq. ⇤
B.5 Consequentialist preferences: type 2
We begin by a simple lemma, the counterpart of Lemmas 1 and 3.
Lemma 5 Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. The expected utility of a decision d 2 J is E(u(d, S)) = ⇢ Pr(pq) if d = pq 1 Pr(pq) if d 6 = pq, and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type profile is given by the analogous expression with conditional probabilities instead of unconditional ones.
Proof. The claim follows from the specification of the utility function. ⇤
We now prove our results about the current preferences. Some proofs implicitly extend (k, l) to values of k.l not in {0, ..., n}, using the expression (5).
Proof of proposition 1. The claim can easily be shown by elaborating the informal argument given in the text. ⇤ Proof of theorem 4. A. First, suppose f : J n ! J is a quota rule with thresholds m p and m q making informative voting e cient. The following claims must be shown.
Proposition 1 as (n v 0 p , n v 0 q ) = (n, n v q ) (n, l q ) > 1/2 (where the first inequality holds by n v q > l q and the second by definition of l q ). Case 2 : n v q < l q . Then by Claim 2 f (v) =pq, a contradiction since f (v) = pq. We have shown one inequality of Claim 3; the other one has an analogous proof. Claim 4 : For all v 2 J n with (n v p , n v q )  1/2, if n v
